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Abstract- Computer systems and their interconnections using 
networks have im-proved the dependence of both the 
organizations as well as the individuals on the stored 
information. This interconnection, in turn, has led to a 
heightened awareness of the need for data security and the 
protection of data and re- sources from electronic frauds, 
electronic eavesdropping, and network-based attacks. 
Consequently, cryptography and network security have 
evolved, leading to the development of smart cards to enforce 
network security. Re-cently, Rafael Martinez-Pelez and Rico-
Novella Francisco [1] pointed out vul-nerabilities in Wang et al. 
[2] scheme. In this paper, we crypt-analyze Wanget al. 
scheme and demonstrated that our proposed scheme 
withstands thevulnerabilities pointed out by Francisco et al. 
and it completes all the re-cent security requirements of [3]. 
We implemented the proposed scheme in MATLAB and 
demonstrated that our proposed scheme is not vulnerable to 
the shortcomings pointed out by Francisco et al. in their 
scheme. 
Keywords: security, authentication, remote user, smart 
card 
I. Introduction 
n 1981, a remote password authentication scheme 
was proposed by L. Lamport [4] over an insecure 
channel. Since then, several schemes [5], [6], [7], [8], 
[9], [10] have been proposed to address this problem 
for achieving more functionality and efficiency. In a 
traditional password scheme, each user has an identity 
and a secret password. If a person wants to log into a 
network system, they must submit their identity and the 
corresponding password. 
 
To avoid storing a plain password table in a 
public network system, several scheme [4], [11], [12] 
have proposed a dictionary of verification tables to store 
each user ID and the corresponding one-way hash 
value of passwords in the remote system. In 2005, 
Chien et al.[9] pointed out that Das et al.[8] scheme 
cannot achieve user anonymity because an attacker can 
trace user with the static value. In 2010, Lee et al.[13] 
have analyzed the security of the smart card based user 
authentication scheme proposed by Lee and Chiu [14]. 
Their security analysis showed that scheme [9] does not 
achieve its main security goal of the two-factor security. 
To demonstrate this, they have shown that the scheme 
is vulnerable to an o_-line dictionary attack in which an 
attacker, who has obtained the secret values stored in 
the users smart card can easily find out its password. 
Besides reporting the security problem, they showed 
what really is causing the problem and how to fix it and 
they proposed a new and improved scheme than Lee 
and Chius scheme. 
In 2012, Francisco et al. have shown security 
vulnerabilities like Denial of service, server spoong, 
impersonation in Wang et al. [2] scheme. We propose a 
scheme that can withstand the above mentioned 
attacks, we implemented and demonstrated the stated 
scheme using MATLAB. The paper is organized as 
follows. 
In Section 2, we give a brief review on Wang et 
al.s scheme. We demon- strate the vulnerabilities of the 
scheme in Section 3. The proposed scheme and its 
security analysis are presented in section 4 and 5. 
Section 6 com- pares the performance of our proposed 
scheme with other related schemes. Finally, we 
conclude this paper in Section 7. 
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 Table 1:
 
Notation Table
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.
 
Review of Wang et al. Scheme
 
Wang et al. proposed a dynamic ID and smart 
card based remote user
 
authentication scheme in which 
the remote server does not maintain a verification table 
and chooses the users password. Table 1 describes the 
notations
 
used in this paper and Table 2 depicts review 
of Wang et al. scheme.
 
Table 2
 
:
 
Wang et al scheme
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Symbol Description
Ui The User
S The Remote Server
IDi Unique identity of Ui
PWi Unique password of Ui
Sk The common session key⊕
The bitwise XOR operation
H(.) A collision free one-way hash function such as SHA-256
x,y Secret Keys of S
User Ui Server S
Registration Phase
Select IDi
Send IDi to Server S
Choose PWi
Compute Ai=H(PWi)⊕H(x)⊕IDi
Store [Ai,y,H(.)] into Smart Card
Sends PWi and Smart Card to Ui
through secure channel
Cryptanalysis and Further Improvement of a Dynamic ID and Smart Card based Remote user 
Authentication Scheme
  
  
 
  
26
Y
e
a
r
20
16
© 2016   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
V
I 
Is
su
e 
IV
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
 
(
)
E
 Table 2 :
 
Wang et al scheme
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2
 
:
 
Wang et al scheme
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
User Ui Server S
Login Phase
Ui keys in his/her IDi and PWi into
smart card terminal and perform:
CIDi=H(PWi)⊕H(Ai⊕y⊕T)⊕IDi
Send Mi=[ IDi, CIDi, Ai,T ] to S.
Verification Phase
Verify T*-T ≤ ∆ T, if time interval
is incorrect then reject login request
otherwise accept Mi and perform:
H(PWi)*=CIDi⊕H(Ai⊕y⊕T)⊕IDi
Compute IDi*=H(PWi)*⊕H(x)⊕Ai
If IDi*and IDi are not equals,
then reject login request otherwise
S performs:
Computes B= H(H(PWi)*⊕y⊕T2)
Sends [B, T2] to Ui
Server Verification Phase
Verify T2-T≤ ∆T, if the time interval
is incorrect then Ui terminate phase,
otherwise perform:
Computes B*=H(H(PWi)
⊕
y
⊕
T2)
If B*=B holds Ui confirms
the identity of S.
User Ui Server S
Password Change Phase
Ui insert smart card into
card reader and keys in his/her PWi,
new password NPWi and performs:
Ai*=Ai⊕H(PWi)⊕H(NPWi)
Store Ai* into smart card
with replacing Ai.
© 2016   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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III.
 
Cryptanalysis of Wang et al. Scheme
 
In this section, we demonstrate that Wang et al. 
scheme is vulnerable to the
 
followings attacks.
 
a)
 
Denial-of-Service attack
 
 
 
 
 
and 
 
Computed  will never match to the  received by 
the server from the user . If such case happens 
unnecessary computing will be performed by the server, 
and it will lead to Denial-of-Service attack.. 
b) Impersonation attack 
Wang et al.'s scheme cannot withstand 
impersonation attack. The attacker can create a valid 
login request message if he/she obtains  and . If 
a legitimate user with mal intent wishes to attack the 
server he/she can extract  from his/her card and can 
establish a valid session with the server and thus 
becoming an attacker using his/ her user privileges. 
Table 3 describes impersonation attack on Wang et al 
scheme. 
Table 3 : Impersonation attack on Wang et al scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legitimate User (Attacker) Ua Server S
Using smart card
Compute H(x)=H(PWa)⊕Aa⊕IDa
Intercept previous message
[IDi,CIDi,Ai,T] of User Ui
H(PWi)=Ai⊕H(x)⊕IDi
CIDi*=H(PWi)⊕H(Ai⊕y⊕T*)⊕IDi
Send Mi=[IDi,CIDi,Ai,T*] to S
Verification Phase
Verify T*-T≤ ∆T, if time interval
is incorrect then reject login request
otherwise accept Mi and perform:
H(PWi)*=CIDi⊕H(Ai⊕y⊕T*)⊕IDi
Compute IDi*=H(PWi)*⊕H(x)⊕Ai
Here IDi* and IDi are equals so
login request accepted by the server
and S performs:
B=H(H(PWi)*⊕y⊕T**)
Sends [B,T**] to Ua
Legitimate User (Attacker) Ua Server S
Server Verification
Verify T**-T*≤ ∆T, now time interval
is correct and Ua perform:
B*=H(H(PWi)⊕y⊕T**)
Now session will successfully start
between the legitimate attacker Ua
and server S.
Table 3 : Impersonation attack on Wang et al scheme
CID
H(PWDi)*=CIDi*⊕H(Ai⊕y⊕T)⊕IDi*
IDi**=H(PWi)*⊕H(x)⊕Ai.
iID *
i
ID
*
*
Ui
A H(x) y
H(x)
*i
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There is no user id and password verification 
mechanism at client terminal. Therefore, if the user 
enters false identity it will compute and 
send it to the server S as login request without verifying 
users identity.S computes
iID * CIDi* Ui
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c)
 
Server spoofing attack
 
Wang et al. scheme is vulnerable to server 
spoofing attack which is shown in
 
Table 4. In this 
scheme, 
 
needs to know 
 
and 
 
for verifying the 
legitimacy
 
of each user. If the attacker is a legitimate 
user 
 
he/she can impersonate as
  
to cheat 
 
because he/she knows 
 
and . After the user 
 
receives the
 
acknowledgement
 
message 
 
he/she will compute 
 
and
 
checks 
whether or not 
 
is equal to 
 
In this case,
 
will 
believe that the attacker
 
is the legitimate S, and will 
establish a session key with 
 
for further 
communication.
Table 4
 
:
 
Server spoofing attack on Wang et al scheme
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legitimate User Ui Legitimate User (Attacker) Ua as S
Login Phase
Ui keys in his/her IDi and PWi
into smart card terminal and per-
form:
CIDi=H(PWi)⊕H(Ai⊕y⊕T)⊕IDi
Send Mi=[IDi,CIDi,Ai,T] to S.
Intercept message Mi of User Ui
Mi=[IDi,CIDi,Ai,T]
Compute H(x)=H(PWa)⊕Aa⊕IDa
Compute H(PWi)=Ai⊕H(x)⊕IDi
Computes B=H(H(PWi)⊕y⊕T**)
Sends [B,T**] to Ui
Server Verification
Verify T**-T*≤ ∆T, if time interval
is correct then Ui perform:
B*= H(H(PWi)⊕y⊕T**)
Now the session will successfully
start between legitimate user Ui
and attacker user Ua.
d) Password Change Phase Flaws
In the password change phase of Wang et al. 
scheme, we observe that an attacker user can 
change password of any other legitimate user 
which is shown in Table 5.
H(x)S y
y
S
S
iU
iU
iU
Ua
H(x)
i ⊕y⊕B*=H(PW T**)
[B,T**]
B* B
iU
iU’s,
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Table 5
 
:
 
Password change flaws of Wang et al scheme
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV.
 
Proposed Scheme
 
This section proposes a strong, secure 
authentication scheme which will with-
 
stand the security 
vulnerabilities which leads to the aforementioned 
attacks.
 
a)
 
Registration phase
 
In this phase, the user 
 
registers with the 
remote server S through a secure
 
channel to be a 
authentic user.
 
Step
 
1:    chooses his/her identity 
 
and password 
 
and computes 
 . Then   sends the
 
registration request 
  
Step 2:
 
Upon receiving
  
from
 
, S 
veri_es the validity of 
 
and computes
  
Step 3:
  
computes
  
                
then captures 
  
current      date and
 
time in T and create 
a record 
 
in its database.
 
Step 4:
  
stores 
 
into the smart card of 
 
and 
sends the smart card
 
through a secure channel to the 
user 
 
Step 5:
 
Upon receiving the smart card from    stores   
into smart card and
 
does not need to remember 
 
after 
_nishing registration phase. Finally, 
 
smart card 
contains 
 
b)
 
Login phase
 
In this phase, when an authentic user want to 
login to the remote server S,
 
he/she must perform the 
following steps:
 
Step 1:
  
inserts his/her smart card into the card reader 
and inputs the identity
  
and password 
 
The smart 
card computes   where is 
retrieved from its memory space.
 
Step 2:
 
The smart card computes
 
 
mod n
 
and sends a login request 
 
to 
 
c)
 
Authentication phase
 
Upon receiving the login request M1 from ,
 
performs the following steps:
 
Legitimate User Ul Attacker User Ua
Login Phase
Ul keys his/her IDl and PWl into
smart card terminal and perform:
Computes
CIDl=H(PWl)⊕H(Al⊕y⊕T)⊕IDl
Send M1=[IDl,CIDl,Al,T] to S.
Intercept message M1 of User Ul
M1=[IDl,CIDl,Al,T]
Compute H(x)=H(PWa)⊕Aa⊕IDa
Change password
Compute H(PWl)=Al⊕H(x)⊕IDl
Attacker user Ua computes:
Aa*=Al⊕H(PWl)⊕H(NPWl)
Store Al* into smart card replacing with Al.
Step 1: reveals M1 by using the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem (CRT) with p and q to obtain and 
. Then veri_es the revealed with the stored
corresponding to ID . If _ T, S replaces with new 
time variable T in its database. Otherwise, rejects 
login request.
Step 2: If Step 1 holds, S computes and 
checks if computed equals received . If it 
holds, would successfully authenticate and
computes the session key shared with 
.
Step 3: computes and send it to .
Step 4: Ui computes M *=H(VIDikRx) and check if 
computed M * equals received . If it does not hold, 
iU
iU
iU
iU
iU
iU
iU
iU ’s,
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
iU
iU
i
U
ID
i
PWi H(IDi ‖PWi‖R where x Rx
number generated by 
random 
‖PWi‖Rx)] to S.
iID
H(ID
[
‖PWi‖RxiID H(ID[ ]
VIDi=H(K⊕IDi)
i=VIDi⊕H(IDi‖PWi‖RxN
T, ]
Rx
[H(.),NiT]
S , iU
[H(.),NiT ]Rx,
iID
iID
PWi
VIDi
VIDi*=Ni⊕H(IDi‖PWi‖Rx), Rx
T=T+1 and M1=(IDi‖VIDi*‖Rx‖T)2
Rx
Ti Ti
TiT T
VIDi
iU ’s,
VIDi*
=H(K⊕IDiVIDi ),
k=H(VIDi‖Rx‖S T)
.iU
2=H(VID‖Rx
M1
M22
2
M
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Ui stops the session. Otherwise, Ui now successfully
authenticate S and use shared 
session key with for securing future communications.
d) Password change phase
In this phase, the user inserts the smart card 
into device and inputs , original password , new 
password and *, where is a new random
iID PWi
PWi*
k=H(VIDi‖Rx‖T)S
S
.iU
Rx *Rx
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number generated by 
 
Then, the smart card 
 
   
    
  
  
 
V.
 
Security Analysis
 
In this section, we analyzed the security of the 
proposed scheme and shown
 
that our scheme is secure 
against the following well-known attacks. The security of
 
our proposed authentication scheme is based on the 
secure hash function and the
  
In the following 
steps, we analyzed the security of the proposed scheme 
to
 
verify that the specified security requirements [3] are 
fulfilled.
 
a)
 
Resistance to user anonymity attack
 
Suppose that the attacker intercepted 
 
authentication messages. Then, the
 
adversary cannot 
retrieve any static parameter from these messages, due 
to the
 
. Hence, the proposed scheme can preserve 
user anonymity.
 
b)
 
Resistance to offine password guessing attack
 
Suppose that a malicious legitimate attacker 
user 
 
has got 
 
smart card,
 
and the secret 
information 
 
and 
 
can also be revealed 
under our
 
assumption of the non-tamper resistant smart 
card. Even after gathering this
 
information, the attacker 
has to at least guess both 
 
and 
 
correctly at the
 
same time, because it has been demonstrated that our 
scheme can provide identity
 
protection. It is impossible 
to guess these two parameters correctly at the same
 
time, and thus the proposed scheme can resist offine 
password guessing attack with
 
smart card security 
breach.
 
c)
 
Resistance to stolen verifier attack
 
In the proposed scheme no sensitive verifiers 
corresponding to the users are
 
maintained by . 
Therefore, the proposed scheme is free from the stolen 
verifier
 
attack.
 
d)
 
Resistance to user impersonation attack
 
As 
  
and 
 
are protected by secure one-
way hash function, any modification to these parameters 
of the legitimate user 
 
will be detected by the server
 
S. Because the attacker has no way of obtaining the 
values of 
 
and 
 
cor-responding to user 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
and 
 
from 
 
Therefore, the proposed 
scheme is free from server masquerading attack.
 
f)
 
Resistance to replay attack
 
Our scheme can withstand replay attack 
because the authenticity of authentcation messages 
 
is verified by checking the time variable T.
 
g)
 
Resistance to parallel session attack
 
If an adversary masquerade as legitimate user 
 
by replaying a previously
 
intercepted authentication 
message. The attacker cannot compute valid T because
 
he does not know the values of 
 
mod n corresponding to
 
user 
 
Therefore, the 
resistance to parallel session attack can be guaranteed 
in
 
our scheme.
 
h)
 
Resistance to mutual authentication
 
In our scheme user 
 
computes 
 
and veri_ed with received
 
. If it hold, 
 
authenticate the server S veri_cation 
successfully and uses
  
shared session 
key with S for future communications.
 
i)
 
Resistance to forward secrecy
 
Based on the dificulty of the one-way hash 
algorithm, any previously generated
 
session keys 
cannot be revealed without knowledge of the 
  
and . As a
 
result our scheme provides the property of 
forward secrecy.
 
VI.
 
Computational Cost
 
Analysis
 
In this scheme we have taken 1.0 unit average 
run time for a single one-way
 
secure hash function 
operation. The proposed scheme requires lower 
computation overhead with comparison to other 
schemes, which is shown in the Table 6 and the Figure 
1.
iID
iID
VIDi
VIDi
iU ’s,
iU ’s,
iU ’s,
.iU
.iU
M1
.iU
CRT.
CRT.
Rx
Rx
Rx
PWi .iU
,PWi
Ni
Ni
[H(.),Ni T
Ua
S
T
.iU
H(IDi‖PWi‖Rx).
1=(IDi‖VIDi‖Rx‖T)2M
2*=H(VIDi‖RxM
2M .iU
Sk=H(VIDi‖Rx‖T
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he/she cannot fabricate the valid and Ni, Therefore,
the proposed scheme is secure against user 
impersonation attack.
e) Resistance to server masquerading attack
In the proposed scheme, a malicious server 
cannot compute the correct mes- sage 
without knowing valid and , S* has to break 
the secure one-way hash function to retrieve iID
VIDi
VIDi
iU ’s, R
2=H(VIDi‖RxM
S *
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computes 
and Finally, the values and stored in 
smart card are replaced with A and R *, 
respectively. Here the password of user has 
been changed to a new password with o_ine 
session.
B*=H(IDi‖PWi*‖RxB=H(IDi‖PWi‖Rx), *)
Ai=Ai⊕B⊕B*. iA Rx
iU ’s, x
*PWi
*PWi
.iU
PWi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6
 
:
 
Computational cost analysis
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schemes:A1:
 
Mishra et al A2:Hao et al A3:Lee et al A4:Wen et al A5:Wang et al
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 :
  
Comparison of computational cost
 
Computational overhead/Scheme A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 Our Sch.
Computation overhead in the registration phase 5Th 5Th 3Th 3Th 2Th 2Th
Execution overhead in the registration phase 5.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0
Computation overhead in the login phase 7Th 3Th 2Th 2Th 2Th 2Th
Execution overhead in the login phase 7.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Computation overhead in the authentication phase 11Th 9Th 5Th 5Th 5Th 5Th
Execution overhead in the authentication phase 11.0 9.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Total execution overhead 23.0 17.0 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.0
Wang et al.s scheme was proposed for 
resolving security issues presented in pre- vious work of 
[8]. However, we have discovered some security aws in 
their scheme making it vulnerable to various attacks 
such as impersonation, server spoofing and denial of 
service attack. Moreover, the scheme cannot withstand 
password change aws. As a remedy to the 
aforementioned weaknesses, we have presented an en-
hanced scheme, which overcome the vulnerabilities of 
[15] and [1] scheme.
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